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U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20507

Office of
General Counsel

August 21, 1990
Ms. Constance DuPre, Clerk
United States Court of Appeals
For the District of Columbia
United States Courthouse
3rd & Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20001
RE:

Ann B. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse,

90-7099.

Dear Ms. DuPre:
Please find enclosed four copies and one original of EEOC's
Opposition to Appellant's Motion to Strike EEOC's Brief as Amicus
Curiae.
If you have any questions or concerns, please do not
hesitate to contact me at the address or telephone number noted
below.
Sincerely,

SUSAN L.P. STARR
Appellate Attorney

Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission
1801 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20507
202/663-4726
FTS/989-4726

cc:

counsel of record

.

.

-

,..
ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 7, 1990

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

No. 90-7099

ANN B. HOPKINS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
PRICE WATERHOUSE,
Defendant-Appellant.

On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the District of Columbia
EEOC'S OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO STRIKE EEOC'S BRIEF AS AMICUS CURIAE

1.

Appellant Price Waterhouse initially argues that EEOC's

brief should be stricken because the Commission did not participate
in this case in earlier proceedings and because it was not aware
that the Commission was going to participate until August 9, 1990,
one day after

it received Hopkins'

brief.

Price Waterhouse's

reasons for striking the Commission's brief are completely without
legal foundation.
United

States

has

Rule 29 F.R.A.P. states that an agency of the
a

right

to

participate

as

amicus

curiae

irrespective of the parties' consent or leave of the court.

The

Commission is under no obligation to notify opposing counsel of its

..
intent to file a brief as amicus, although we did so in this case
out of courtesy to Price Waterhouse.

The Commission filed its

1
brief only two days after Hopkins' brief was filed so as to give

Price Waterhouse

as

much

time

as

possible

to

respond

to

the

2
Commission's argument in its reply brief.

2.
also

Price Waterhouse alleges that the Commission's brief should
be

stricken

assertions.

because

However,

it

is

rife

with

inaccurate

factual

the Commission supported every statement

Price Waterhouse now challenges by a cite to a published decision.
Price Waterhouse fails to show how the brief misrepresents the
3
particular authority cited, with one possible exception •

Instead,

they attempt to hide behind a smokescreen of baseless allegations

Local Rule ll(e) (3) allows amicus briefs to be filed as
much as fifteen days after "service of the brief of the party whose
Because this was an
side the intervenor or amicus supports."
expedited appeal, the Commission filed its brief well ahead of that
schedule.
2

Price Waterhouse chose not to address the Commission's
arguments in its August 15, 1990 reply brief, allegedly because
they were not notified earlier of the Commission's participation.
However, despite its argument that the lack of additional notice
"deprived Price Waterhouse of a meaningful opportunity [to
respond]" (appellant motion at 2), Price Waterhouse apparently had
sufficient time to challenge many of the issues raised in the
Commission's brief in its motion to strike, filed the very same
day as the reply brief.
3

Price Waterhouse correctly points out that this Court
stated in its 1987 decision that there was only one comment made
by a partner who opposed Hopkins' candidacy which was gender
However, it appeared from the
Motion at 4, n.1.
specific.
district court's findings that there were two gender specific
comments made by opponents of Hopkins. ( "One commentator said 'she
may have overcompensated for being a woman.' Another suggested that
Supporters
she needed to take a 'course in charm school. '
indicated that her critics judged her harshly due to her sex . .
. "Hopkins, 618 F. supp. 1109, 1115-16).
2

of EEOC misconduct.
Price Waterhouse argues that the Commission's statement that
"it was clear from the evidence that [Price Waterhouse] would not
voluntarily admit her to the partnership" (EEOC br. at 9) misstated
the record.
accurate.

However,

the Commission could not have been more

The district court said, "[o]rdering Price Waterhouse

to simply reconsider Ms. Hopkins for partnership would be futile
and unjust, because the testimony of Price Waterhouse's chairman
at the relief trial suggested that the deck is stacked against her.
Price

Waterhouse

plainly

voluntarily admit her."
Citing

the

does

not

want

her

and

would

not

Slip op. at 19.

district

court's

vacated

1985

decision,

Price

Waterhouse also argues that it was inaccurate for the Commission
to state that sexual stereotyping permeated their decision to place
Hopkins' candidacy on hold.

Again Price Waterhouse chooses to

ignore the specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in the
district

court's

1990

decision.

The

court

held

that

Price

Waterhouse failed to meet its burden of specifically identifying
which partner comments were tainted by sexual stereotyping and
which were not,

thereby leaving the court to conclude that sex

discrimination motivated the decision to place Hopkins' candidacy
on hold:
Price
Waterhouse,
having
permitted
discriminatory
comments to be weighed in the hold decision when
appraising Ms. Hopkins, was required to separate the good
from the bad . . . It was apparent from the testimony
that disentangling stereotyping from fact is difficult
. Moreover, the Court has been provided with no
guidance to enable it to differentiate between all
sexually stereotyped comments and comments not influenced
3

by stereotyping . • . Ms. Hopkins must be deemed to have
failed to receive partnership at the time she was held
over because of sex discriminati on, in violation of Title
VII.
Slip op. at 8-9, 11.

In light of these findings, the Commission's

characteriza tion of Price Waterhouse's 1982 partnership evaluation
process as being permeated by sexual stereotyping was completely
accurate.
Price

Waterhouse

also

alleges

that

the

Commission

mischaracter ized the record by stating that Price Waterhouse failed
to

introduce evidence that

discriminato ry animus.
brief says.

its partners were not motivated by

However, that is not what the Commission's

The Commission did not offer an opinion as to whether

Price Waterhouse did or did not introduce evidence on this issue
in the 1985 trial.

Instead,

the brief merely states that the

Commission agrees with the district court's conclusion that,
part of its burden of proof,

Price Waterhouse was obligated to

present some evidence of the partner's motivations.
14.

The

Commission went

conclusion that,

on

as

to

embrace

the

EEOC br. at

district

court's

because Price Waterhouse failed to present any

evidence whatsoever on remand, Price Waterhouse failed to meet its
burden.

See slip op.

challenging

the

at

district

10.

Price Waterhouse

court's

Commission's reliance thereon.

findings

of

is apparently
fact

and

the

Al though they certainly have a

right to do so, Price Waterhouse's characteriza tion of EEOC's brief
as distorting the record is inaccurate.

4

WHEREFORE,

the

EEOC

respectfully

requests

this

Court

deny

Price Waterhouse's motion to strike EEOC's brief in this appeal.

Respectfully submitted,
DONALD R. LIVINGSTON
General Counsel(Acting)
GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS
Associate General Counsel

VINCENT J. BLACKWOOD
Assistant General Counsel

SUSAN L.P. STARR
Attorney
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION
1801 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20507
202/663-4726
FTS/989-4726
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing motion have
been sent by messenger, costs prepaid, to the following
counsel of record:
Theodore B. Olson
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Suite 900
Washington, D.C.
20036
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

James H. Heller
Douglas B. Huron
KATOR, SCOTT & HELLER
1275 K Street, N.W.
Suite 950
Washington, D.C. 20005
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

SUSAN L.P. STARR
Attorney
Appellate Services
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION
1801 L Street, N.W., Rm 7020
Washington, D.C.
20507
(FTS)/989-472 6
202/663-4726

August 21, 1990

